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On the Equivalence of McEliece’s and 
Niederreiter’s Public-Key Cryptosystems 
Yuan Xing Li, Member, IEEE, Robert H. Deng, 
and Xin Mei Wang, Member, IEEE 
Abstract-It is shown that McEliece’s and Niederreiter’s public-key 
cryptosystems are equivalent when set up for corresponding choices 
of parameters. A security analysis for the two systems, based on this 
equivalence observation, is presented. 
Index Tenns-Cryptosystems, McEliece’s cryptosystem, Niederreiter’s 
cryptosystem, security, algebraic codes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the concept of public-key cryptosystems appeared in the 
fundamental paper of Diffie and Hellman [ l ]  in 1977, the field of 
cryptology has undergone a dramatic development. The last decade 
has seen explosive growth in unclassified research in all aspects of 
cryptology. Public-key cryptosystem and cryptanalysis have been 
two of the most active areas. So far many kinds of public-key 
cryptosystems have been proposed, and many of them that had been 
thought to be secure have been broken. 
A special class of public-key cryptosystems were constructed 
based on algebraic error-correcting codes. In the present paper, 
we focus on two such systems, McEliece’s [2] and Niederreiter’s 
[3] cryptosystems, examine the relationship between the two, and 
derive the interesting result that the two systems are equivalent and 
have the same security when set up for corresponding choices of 
parameters. This result allows us to clarify the security evaluations 
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of Niederreiter’s cryptosystem, by Niederreiter [3] and by Brickell 
and Odlyzko [4]. Furthermore, we employ the best known attack, the 
Lee-Brickell attack [5], to cryptanalyze the two systems. Some new 
optimal parameter values and work factors are obtained. 
We briefly review McEliece’s and Niederreiter’s cryptosystems in 
Section 11. The equivalence of the two systems is derived in Section 
III. Finally, we cryptanalyze the two systems and comment on the 
selection of optimal system.parameters in Section IV. 
II. MCELIECE’S AND NIEDERREITER’S CRWroSYSTEMS 
In this section, brief descriptions of McEliece’s and Niederreiter’s 
cryptosystems are presented in order to facilitate discussions in later 
sections. Both ctyptosystems are algebraic-coded two-key systems. 
The basic idea behind them was to construct a linear error-correcting 
code for which a fast decoding algorithm is known, and then to 
disguise it as a general linear code whose decoding problem is 
NP-complete. 
A. McEliece ’s Cryptosystem [2] 
This system uses a binary (n, k,  2t+ 1) Goppa code C where n is 
the code length, k is the code dimension, and t is the error-correcting 
capability of C. C is constructed by randomly selecting an irreducible 
polynomial of degree t over GF(2’) as the Goppa polynomial (note 
that n = 2’). Let G be a k x n generator matrix of C [6], S any 
k x k nonsingular matrix, and P any n x n permutation matrix. 
Private Key: G, S, P. 
Public Key: G‘ = SGP and t. 
Messages: k bit vectors m over GF(2). 
Encryption: c = mG‘ + e. e, an n bit error vector with 
(Hamming) weight t. c, the n bit ciphertext. 
Decryption: Since c = mSGP + e, cP-’ = (mS)G + eP-’ . 
Use a fast decoding algorithm for C to correct the error “eP-’, 
find mS and thus m. 
McEliece investigated several attacks against his system. One of 
those was to factor the public key to obtain the private key, but 
this approach was thought to be hopeless. Another attack, considered 
as the most promising, was to pick k “error-free” elements of the 
ciphertext c, and then to solve a set of A linear equations to recover the 
message m. Using this attack, McEliece suggested using n = 1024 
and t = 50, i.e., (1024, 524, 101) Goppa code in his system. The 
corresponding work factor of the system is approximately 2’O.’ [7]. 
B. Nederreiter’s Cryptosystem [3] 
This is a knapsack-type cryptosystem which employs an 
(n, k ,  2t + 1) linear code C over GF(q). Let E be an (n  - k) x n 
parity check matrix of C, M any (n  - k )  x (n - k) nonsingular 
matrix, and P any n x n permutation matrix, all over GF(q). 
Private Key: E ,  M ,  and P. 
Public Key: H‘ = M H P  and t .  
Messages: n dimensional vectors J over GF(q) with weight t. 
Encryption: z = #HIT. z, the ciphertext of dimension n - k. 
Decryption: Since z = J ( M H P ) ~ ,  z(MT)-’ = (@“)BT. 
Use a fast decoding algorithm for C to find g$ and thus g. 
Niederreiter [3] cryptanalyzed his system and mentioned two 
example systems, one using a binary concatenated (104,24, 31) code 
and the other using a (30, 12, 19) ReedSolomon code over GF(31). 
The examples were later verified as insecure by Brickell and Odlyzko 
0018-9448/94$04.00 Q 1994 IEEE 
212 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 40, NO. 1, JANUARY 1994 
[4]. The attack used in Niederreiter’s cryptanalysis was to factorize 
H’ in the hope of getting M, H ,  and P. However, this cryptanalysis 
was not sufficient to ensure the security of his cryptosystem. Actually, 
McEliece has shown that this attack was not the most threatening. 
In the following, we derive the equivalence relationship between 
the two cryptosystems, and re-evaluate the securities of the two 
systems using the best known attack, the LeeBrickell attack. 
m. EQUIVALENCE OF THE MCELIECE’S 
AND NIEDERREITERS CRYFTOSYSTEMS 
A fair comparison of the two systems dictates that they both be 
based on the same error-correcting (n, k, 2t + 1) linear code C. Let 
H and G denote the parity check matrix and the generator matrix, 
respectively, of C. Then finding H from G (or equivalently finding 
G from H )  can be achieved by linear algebra [6]. For instance, by 
converting the generator matrix into the systematic form G = [IkA],  
the parity check matrix is simply given by H = -[ATIn-k]. 
Given the public key G’ and the encryption equation e = mG‘ +e  
in McEliece’s cryptosystem, multiplying both sides of the equation 
by HIT, we obtain 
since G’HrT = 0.  Note that (1) is identical to Niederreiter’s 
encryption equation. Given z and H ‘ ,  if e can be found, i.e., 
Niederreiter’s cryptosystem is broken, so is McEliece’s cryptosystem. 
Therefore, it is not more difficult to break McEliece’s cryptosystem 
than to break Niederreiter’s cryptosystem. 
On the other hand, given the public key H’ and the encryption 
equation z = yHtT in Niederreiter’s cryptosystem, by line& algebra, 
an n-dimensional vector e of weight larger than or equal to t can 
be found such that z = cHIT. Obviously, e may be expressed as 
c = m G ‘ + y  (2) 
where m is a k-dimensional vector and the weight of y is t. 
Equation (2) is just (2) McEliece’s encryption equation. Therefore, 
if McEliece’s cryptosystem can be broken, so can Niederreiter’s 
cryptosystem. 
IV. SECURITY COMMENTS 
McEliece [2] suggested two possible attacks on his cryptosystem. 
The first attack is to factor the public key G’ in the hope of finding 
the private key S, G, and P ,  i.e., finding trapdoors to his system. 
Adams and Meijer [7] stated that there is usually only one trapdoor 
in McEliece’s cryptosystem. Recently, Gibson [8] showed that there 
always exist multiple trapdoors in any instance of McEliece’s system. 
However, it seems difficult to find trapdoors to McEliece’s system. 
The second attack proposed by McEliece is to directly recover m 
from c without using the private key. The basic idea of this attack 
is to repeatedly select k bits at random from an n-bit ciphertext 
vector and estimate m based on the k selected bits. If the k selected 
bits are error-free, the message m will be recovered; otherwise, the 
process is repeated by selecting another set of k bits from e until the 
message is recovered correctly. 
The best known attack, proposed by Lee and Brickell [5] ,  is a 
generalization of McEliece’s second attack. The Lee-Brickell attack 
allows the k selected bits to contain some errors, and try to recover 
the message correctly. Because of the equivalence of McEliece’s and 
Niedereiter’s cryptosystems, in the following we will cryptanalyze 
McEliece’s cryptosystem under the best known attack. The results 
of the analysis apply equally well to Niederreiter’s cryptosystem, 
provided that the two cryptosystems are based on the same error- 
correcting code. Without loss of generality, we assume, throughout 
the rest of the paper, that the same binary error-correcting codes are 
used in the two systems. 
Attack 1 (Lee-Brick11 Attack): Picke a k x k submatrix G6 of 
G’ consisting of the j l th ,  j ~ t h ,  . , and the jkth columns of G’. 
Let ek and ek be the k dimensional vectors consisting of the jl th, 
jzth,. , and the j h  th bits of e and e, respectively. It then follows that 
ek +ek = mG6 and that (ck +ek)(GL)-lG = mGL(GL)-lG = 
mG. Choose a k-bit vector e i  with j(< t )  or fewer ones. If 
e+ (ek +ei)(GL-l)G has weight t ,  then e i  = ek and the message 
m = (ck + ek)(GL)-’ is recovered; otherwise, choose another e6 
and repeat the above process. If all the k bit error pattems eL of 
weight 5 j have been exhausted and the message still can not be 
recovered, then pick another submatrix of G’ and the above process 
is repeated. The process continues until m is found. 
The probability that there are i errors in the randomly chosen k-bit 
vector ck is 
PZ = (f) (; 1 ; ) I ( ; )  
Therefore, the probability that the attack completes successfully is 
C:=,pZ and that the average number of times we must repeat the 
algorithm before we are successful is 
3 
T3 = l/Et. (3) 
i=O 
The number of k bit error pattems with j or fewer ones is 
N, = k(t). 
*=O 
Thus, the average overall work factor for this attack is 
W1, = T3(ak3 + N,/3k). (4) 
Attack 1 is based on the encryption equation e = mG‘ + e. As 
we have previously shown, this equation can be transformed into 
the encryption equation z = e a t T  by linear algebra. Therefore, the 
security of McEliece’s cryptosystem may also be analyzed using a 
Lee-Brickell type attack based on z = earT .  This is demonstrated 
below. 
Attuck2: Pick an (n - k) x (n - k) submatrix H k - k  of H‘ 
consisting of the j l th ,  jz th , . . .  ,j,-hth columns of H‘.  Let en-k 
be the (n - k) bit vector consisting of the j l th ,  j z t h ,  ... ,jn-kth 
bits of e. Let en(n - k) be the n bit vector which is identical to 
en-k in positions j1, jz, . . . , j n - k ,  and with the other k positions 
set to zero. Furthermore let en(k = e + en(n - k ) .  Then z = 
Multiply both sides of the above equation by ( H E k ) - ’ ,  and 
after rearrangement, we have en-k = ( z  + en(k)H’T)(HEk)- ’ .  
Choose an n-bit vector eh(k) with (TI - k) zeros at positions 
j1, jz, . . . , j n - k ,  and j(< t )  or fewer ones at the other k positions. 
Calculate E ( z  + eh(k)H’T)(H:k)-l .  Augment e& 
into an n bit vector eh(n - k )  which is identical to in 
positions j, , j, , . . . , j, -k , and with the other ]E positions set to zero. 
If &(n-k)+&(k)  has weight t and (eh(n-k)+eh(k))H‘T = z ,  
then e = &(n - k )  + eh(k) is found; otherwise, choose another 
eh(k) and repeat the above procedure. If all the possible vectors 
eh(k) have been tried and e still cannot be found, pick another 
H k - k  and repeat the above process. The process continues until 
e is recovered. 
eHtT = (en(n - k )  + - ( k ) ) H ‘  4 = en(n - k)HIT +en(k)HIT. 
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The probability that there are t - i ones among the randomly chosen 
( n  - k) bit vector e,-h is 
= (:) (; 1 :)I(;). 
Therefore the probability that the algorithm finishes successfully is 
pi. The average number of executions T’ is then again given 
by (3) with pi’s given in (5). The number of all possible n bit error 
patterns eh(k) is 
Consequently, the average overall work factor for attack 2 is 
W2, = T,(cy(n - k ) 3  + N 3 p ( n  - k ) ) .  (6) 
With cy = p, Lee and Brickell showed that the optimum j 
which minimizes the work factor W1, is 2 for all values of useful 
code parameters. This conclusion also applies to W2,. Assuming 
cy = /3 = 1 and n = 1024, they further showed that the value of 
t which maximizes Wl2 is 38 and that Wlz M 273.4. This result 
represents a reduction of order 2” as compared with the work factor 
obtained by Adams and Meijer [7]. 
With Attacks 1 and 2 presented above, the work factor of attacking 
McEliece’s-Nederreiter’s cryptosystem should be defined as 
W = min(Wl2, W22) (7) 
and the coding parameters should be selected to maximize W. Again 
assuming cy = p = 1 and n = 1024, our calculations showed that the 
value o f t  which maximizes (7) is 41. With this new optimum value 
o f t ,  Wlz M 273.1, W22 M 271.9, and therefore, W = W22 M 271.9. 
Note that, although t = 38 maximizes Wlz, it does not maximizes 
W, since in this case W22 M 271.8. 
Brickell and Odlyzko [4] proposed another attack on McEliece’s 
cryptosystem based on the low density algorithm of [9]. However, 
the lattice basis reduction algorithm employed in this attack is not 
guaranteed to find the vector e, and the attack does not seem 
promising. 
It should be mentioned that Korzhik and Turkin [lo] claimed to 
have found a polynomial time algorithm for decoding linear codes 
up to their minimum distance, which in particular would allow one 
to break the two cryptosystems discussed in this paper. However, 
since the description of this algorithm is very complicated and its 
correct functioning within the claimed time bounds could never be 
confirmed experimentally according to the authors’ information, it 
appears doubtful whether this attack has any real significance. 
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An Attack on the Interlock Protocol 
When Used for Authentication 
Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt 
A6ssiract-Exponential key exchange may be used to establish secure 
communications between two parties who do not share a private key. 
It fails in the presence of an active wiretap, however. Davies and Price 
suggest the use of S h d r  and Rivest’s “Interlock Protocol” to surmount 
this difEculty. We demonstrate that an active attacker can, at the cost of a 
timeout alarm, bypass the passwork exchange, and capture the passwords 
used. Furthermore, if the attack is from a terminal or workstation 
attempting to contact a computer, the attacker wi l l  have access before 
any alarm can be sounded. 
Index Tenns-Cryptography, protocol, security, authentication, expo- 
nential key exchange, Ditlie-Hellman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The exponential key exchange protocol [l] has been suggested as 
a form of public-key cryptosystem. It is also useful if two parties 
wish to set up a secret conversation without prior arrangement, as 
the public keys are relatively easy to generate. 
The dialog works as follows. Let a and p be large, publicly known 
numbers. Suppose that A wishes to talk privately with B. Each side 
picks a random number, AR and BR. The following messages are 
sent: 
a A R m o d P  + 
t aBRmodP.  
At this point, A, who knows AR,  can calculate 
( c v ~ ” ) ~ ”  modp c y A R B R  modp. 
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